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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HOWELLS, INC.,
a corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 14,829

vs.
WILLIAM NELSON, a/k/a
WILLIAM LORD ASSOCIATES,
Defendant-Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an action by the plaintiff to collect the sum
of $2,852.66 owed by the defendant and to hold defendant
William Nelson personally liable for the debt.

Plaintiff

also claims attorney's fees because the defendant gave the
plaintiff an insufficient funds check on the account in the
amount of $2,164.19.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On September 1, 1976, the case was tried without a jury
before the Honorable J. Robert Bullock, Judge.

The Court

awarded judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against
William Lord Corporation, doing business as William Lord
Associates.
Appellant is attempting to appeal from the judgment of
the trial Court.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks a dismissal of the appeal of the
appellant, or in the alternative, an affirmance of the
judgment of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent disagrees with several of the facts stated
by the appellant and believes

that the facts so stated are

incomplete.
On February 5, 1976, a check was issued to Howells,
Inc., on the account of William Lord Associates, and over
the signature of William H. Nelson.
amount of $2,164.19.

The check was in the

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 1).

Judgment of

$2,852.66 was entered on stipulation of the parties, that
being the total amount due on the account of the defendant.
When defendant, William Nelson, delivered the check to
the plaintiff's offices, he had a conversation with the
Secretary-Treasurer and credit manager, Ettie Mosher.

Mr.

Nelson requested Mr. Mosher to hold the check for two weeks
until he had made a bank deposit.

(R. 10, 13).

The check

was presented to the bank on February 26, 1976, after which
it was returned to the plaintiff unpaid by reason of insufficient funds in the account of "William Lord Associates".
The check was again submitted on approximately March 2,
1976, and was again returned unpaid.
At trial i t was shown that there was no corporation
"William Lord Associates", nor had a certificate of doing
business under an assumed name been filed with the Secretary

-2-
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of State.

It was, however, agreed by the parties and found

by the Court that William Lord Corporation was doing business as William Lord Associates, William Lord Corporation
being a duly incorporated corporation in the State of Utah.
Plaintiff claimed that since defendant knew at the time
of the issuance of the check that there were insufficient
funds, Utah Code Annotated 7-15-1 and 2, make defendant
William Nelson personally liable, entitle plaintiff to
attorney's fees.
The trial court found that because the check had been
given to the plaintiff by the defendant with a request to
hold it for two weeks before depositing it, the check was a
promissory note and not a check within the meaning of Utah
Code Annotated 7-15-1.

Consequently, at the close of trial

on September l, 1976, the Court awarded judgment in the
amount of $2,164.19 against William Lord Corporation.

(R. 2 4) •

On September 14, 1976, counsel for plaintiff submitted
to the Court a Judgment and Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law.

On September 16, 1976, the Court signed the Judg-

ment and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, but
the Judgment erroneously awarded judgment against "William
Nelson, Inc.", instead of William Lord Corporation.
37, 38-40).

(R. 36,

Consequently, on September 21, 1976, the defen-

dant filed a "Motion to Conform Judgment to the Proof or in
Lieu thereof, Motion for New Trial".

(R. 33-34).

The

defendant pointed out to the Court that Judgment had been
erroneously entered against William Nelson Inc., a corporaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tion instead of William Lord Corporation.

Defendant asked

that in the event the Judgment was not modified to conform
to the proof, then a new trial should be granted, since the
Judgment entered was not supported by any evidence.

Counsel

for plaintiff filed no response to the Motion and on October
14, 1976, the Court granted defendant's motion to Conform
Judgment to the proof and ordered counsel for the defendant
to prepare an appropriate amended judgment.

{R. 32).

On October 20, 1976, counsel for plaintiff filed a
Notice of Appeal, appealing to this Court from the "Judgment"
of the trial court entered on the 16th day of September,
1976.

The Notice of Appeal was dated September 22, 1976,

but was, in fact, not mailed to the defendant until October
12, and not filed with the clerk until October 20.

On

October 21, the Court signed the Amended Judgment and the
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

The Amended

Judgment awarded judgment to the plaintiff against William
Lord Corporation in the amount of $2,852.66, and awarded
plaintiff no attorney's fees.
Plaintiff did not amend its Notice of Appeal to include
the Amended Judgment nor did it file a subsequent Notice of
Appeal.

As the case now stands, the plaintiff has appealed

from the original judgment entered by the Court but has not
appealed from the amended judgment.

It should be remembered

that the original judgment granted judgment against William
Nelson, Inc., a corporation.

William Nelson, Inc., is not

named as a defendant in this action, nor was that term ever
-4-
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used by anyone prior to its inclusion in the judgment
prepared by counsel for plaintiff.
POINT I
THIS COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER THIS APPEAL.
Plaintiff's Notice of Appeal states that it is appealing
from the judgment of the trial court entered on the 16th day
of September 1976.

(R. 31).

Plaintiff made no attempt to amend its notice of appeal
or file a new notice of appeal when judgment was entered on
October 21, 1976.

As a result, plaintiff appeals from a

judgment which has been rendered null and void by an_ amendment, thereby making plaintiff's appeal moot.
Appellant has completely failed to recognize the
amended judgment, never mentions the amended judgment in its
brief, and is apparently unconcerned about it.
While respondent realizes that defects in appellant
procedure are subject to waiver, U.R.C.P. 73, State v. Good,
9 Ariz.App. 388, 452 P.2d 715 (1960);

that the object of a

notice of appeal is to advise the opposite party that an
appeal has been taken, Nunley v. Stan Katz Real Estate Inc.,
15 Utah2d 126, 388 P.2d 798 (1964); and that rules and
statutes implementing the right of appeal are liberally
construed and applied in the furtherance of justice, Wood
v. Turner, 18 Utah2d 229, 419 P.2d 634

(1966); in the present

case there is a technical defect in the appellate instruments
of the plaintiff which this Court cannot correct.
Respondent submits that the case of Nunley v. Stan Katz
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Real Estate Inc., supra, while different in fact is correct
in principle and binding in the present case.
In Nunley, a judgment was entered and 11 days later
motions for a new trial and to amend the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law were filed.

The trial court heard

the motions and granted an amendment to the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and a judgment was subsequently
entered.

Defendant appealed from the subsequent judgment.

In deciding the case, this court was "initially faced
with a procedural question, i.e., whether this Court can act
on an appeal from an admittedly void judgment."

It was

determined that the subsequent judgment was void because the
motion for a new trial and to amend the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law was filed too late for the lower court to
act.

Appellant claimed that the notice of appeal, while

designating the subsequent judgment, was a clerical error
and should have designated the prior judgment which appeal
would then have been timely, since it would have been within
the thirty day period.
This Court in Nunley determined that there would be no
problem if it were faced with only one judgment appealed
from, but in fact, there were two judgments.

In deciding

the case, the Court stated:
Respondent is entitled to know specifically which judgment is being appealed. The second judgment being
different from the first, and in addition, void takes this case from the
realm of a mere clerical error as was
evidentally made in the Price case.
The date becomes material in this
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instance and we are not inclined to
correct appellant's error. Nunley,
supra, at BOO.
The Court in Nunley concluded that an appeal cannot be
taken from a void judgment.

While the fact situation was

essentially backwards from that in the present case, the
same principles apply.

Plaintiff appeals from a void judg-

ment, thereby depriving this Court of jurisdiction to hear
the matter.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN NOT AWARDING ATTORNEY'S
FEES TO PLAINTIFF.
As stated above, Judgment of the trial court awarded
judgment against William Lord Corporation of $2,852.66 and
costs in the amount of $25.00, but denied judgment against
defendant William Nelson personally and awarded plaintiff no
attorney's fees.
Appellant contends that Utah Code Annotated §7-15-1 and
2 entitle it to attorney's fees in this action.

In order to

make U.C.A. §7-15-1 applicable, the following elements must
be established:
1.

The person must willfully, with intent to defraud

draw any check, draft or order, and
2.

The document must in fact be a check, draft, or

order.
These two elements have not been established by the appellant.
First, the instrument signed by Mr. Nelson and given to
the plaintiff was essentially a post dated check and thereSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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fore, a promissory note.

It is undisputed that at the time

of the transfer of the document, plaintiff's agent was
informed that the check should not be deposited for a period
of two weeks since there would be insufficient funds to
cover the check during that time.

(R. 10, 13).

In State

v. Bruce, 1 Utah2d 136, 262 P.2d 960 (1953), this Court,
in a criminal case, held that a post dated check could not
be used in a conviction for criminal fraud.

The Court

stated at 962:
The portions of our statute relating to
bogus checks, material to the present inquiry,
are:
"Any person who * * * wilfully, with
intent to defraud, makes * * or delivers any check, * * * knowing at
the time * * * that the maker *
*
has not sufficient funds in, or credit
with said bank * * for the payment of
such check * * * is punishable * * *

*

"The making, * * * or delivering of
such check, * * * shall be prima
facie evidence of intent to defraud."
(Emphasis added) .
The emphasized words indicate that the
statute denounces the passing of a bad check
only where there is misrepresentation that the
maker has money or credit at the time the bad
check is passed.
It logically follows that it
does not apply when both maker and payee know
that the check is postdated. Under such circumstances the clear inference is that the
maker has not money to pay the check at the
time, but intends to cover it by the postdate.
Where the payee accepts it with that understanding, he is not relying on a representation that the maker has money in the bank
at the time, but rather that it will be covered when it is presented on its date. This
amounts to a promise to be performed in ~
future.
Obviously such a promise may be made
in good faith, but plans go awry, unexpected
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or uncontrollable events intervene, or a
bona fide change of mind occurs, any one of
which would negative the existence of an intent to defraud at the time the check was
passed, thus eliminating an element essential to constitute the crime. Such reasoning
is the basis of the general rule that a promise of performance in the future will
usually not support a charge of fraud.
We so
held with respect to a postdated check in the
case of State v. Trogstad.
(Emphasis added).
For additional cases holding that acceptance of a
postdated check or one wherein the drawer indicates that the
check should be held for a period of time because of insufficient funds, is equivalent to an extension of credit;
see Seaboard Oil Company v. Cunningham, 51 F.2d 321, cert.
den. 284 U.S. 657, 76 L.Ed. 557, 52 S.Ct. 35 (1931); People v.
Poyett, 99 Cal.Rptr. 750, 492 P.2d 1150 (1972); People v. Meller,
185 Colo. 389, 524 P.2d 1366 (1974); State v. Eikleberger,
72 Idaho 245, 239 P.2d 1069 (1951); People v. Mazeloff, 229
App.Div. 451, 242 N.Y.S. 623 (1930).
The above authorities clearly indicate that a check
given with a representation that there are presently insufficient funds to cover the check and that it should be
held for a number of days proscribe the application of
U.C.A. §7-15-1 since the transaction becomes an extension of
credit.
In addition, the document signed by William Nelson does
not constitute a "check" within the meaning of U.C.A. §70A3-104.

That section defines a check as a "draft drawn on a

bank and payable on demand".

This same section states that

to be a negotiable instrument, an instrument is either
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"payable on demand or at a definite time".

Since the in-

strwnent in the present case was not payable on demand but
was payable at a definite time, it was not a check as defined in this section and the only other

applicable de-

finition is that of a "note".
Utah Code Annotated §70A-3-109, defines "definite time"
as "payable or before a stated date or at a fixed period
after a stated date".
In the present case, the instrwnent negotiated by
defendant William Nelson was not a "check" as defined by the
Uniform Commercial Code, and therefore, appellant failed to
establish an essential element required by U.C.A. §7-15-1.
The second element essential for a .claim under U.C.A.
§7-15-1 is also lacking, that of willful intent to defraud
at the time of the making of the instrwnent.
As previously stated, it is undisputed that the SecretaryTreasurer for the plaintiff accepted the check on the representation by the defendant that it was to be held for two
weeks until such time that he could deposit funds in the
account.
Essentially the same fact situation occurred in State v.
Trogstad, 98 Utah 565, 100 P.2d 564
involved a criminal prosecution.

(1940), except that it

In that case, this Court

ruled at 566:
The statute provides that there
must be proved (a) an intent to defraud,
and (b) a knowledge that the maker or
drawer did not have (1) sufficient funds
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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or l21 credit with the bank for payment.
The essence of the charge is that the injured party must have relied upon some
false and deceitful pretense. The check
must have been drawn, uttered or delivered
willfully and with the intent to defraud
and knowing there was neither sufficient
funds nor credit with the firm or person
upon whom i t was drawn.
The specific intent to defraud must
be found from the evidence. Such intent
must be shown to exist in the mind of the
maker or drawer. Intent may be found from
the circumstances. Reliance by the receiver of the check, draft or order upon
the representations made at the time of
the transaction and damage resulting therefrom are elements of the fraud.
If the
receiver accepted the check, draft or order
as evidence of a loan, an essential element
of fraud would be wanting. In the instant
case, there is evidence that the transaction was one between a borrower and a lender.
Mrs. Frakes knew that there were no
funds available for payment of the check
immediately, when she received the $300
check, but that it was to be held for a few
days until it was good. This is in accord
with Mrs. Frake's own testimony. She held
it for some time and tried to collect upon
it.
In other words, Mrs. Frakes treated
the check as a promise to pay in the future,
rather than as a check. This rebuts any
idea that the check was delivered as a
check with intent to defraud.(Emphasis
added) .
While U.C.A. §7-15-2 includes a presumption of fraud,
if there are insufficient funds when the check is drawn or
presented, that presumption is rebutted if the payee accepts
the check as a promise to pay and not as a negotiable instrument.

That was exacly the situation in State v. Trogstad

and in the present case.

See also Meller, supra; In Re Griffin,

83 Cal.Appl. 779, 257 P.2d 458 (1927); and People v. Burnett,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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39 Cal.2d 556, 247 P.2d 828, 1952.
In the present case the appellant failed to prove that
the document accepted was a check, was accepted as a check
by the plaintiff's agent, or that at the time of the acceptance the defendant had the intent to defraud the plaintiff.
POINT III
DEFANDANT WILLIAM NELSON IS NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE
ON THE JUDGMENT IN THE PRESENT CASE.
Appellant contends that Defendant William Nelson, since
he signed the check in question, is personally liable for
the amount of the check.

The trial court found that William

Lord Associates was an assumed name for William Lord Corporation,
and since the defendant was an officer for that corporation,
he had no personal liability when he signed the document.
Appellant contends that since the defendant failed to
comply with the assumed name statute, U.C.A. §42-2-5, defendant
William Nelson is personally liable for the check.

What

appellant fails to realize is that the assumed name statute
merely precludes the. filing of a lawsuit by one who has
failed to properly register.
Penalties. Any person or persons who
shall carry one, conduct or transact any
such subiness under an assumed name without having complied with the provisions
of this act, shall not sue, prosecute or
maintain any action, suit, counterclaim,
cross-complaint or preceeding in any of
the courts of this state until the provisions of this chapter have been complied with, and any such person or persons so failing to comply shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor. U.C.A. §42-2-10.
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There is nothing in the assumed name statute nor in the
provisions relating to corporations which makes an individual officer of the corporation liable for failure of the
corporation to register for doing business under an assumed
name.
Appellant's attempt to place liability on Mr. Nelson
through case law is equally misplaced.

All of the cases

cited by appellant involve an officer or director who knew
that there were insufficient funds at the time the check was
written but failed to inform the other party thereby willfully defrauding the payee.

In the present case, there was

no fraud, and therefore, there can be no imposition of
liability upon defendant William Nelson.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's appeal is defective, and consequently, this
Court has no jurisdiction to hear the matter.
If the Court does consider the matter, the appellant
has nevertheless failed to establish that at the time the
document was issued by William Lord Associates, that there
was an intent to defraud the plaintiff, and consequently,
the document does not constitute a check and further, defendant William Nelson cannot be personally liable for its
issuance.
Respondent respectfully requests the Court to dismiss
the appeal, or in the alternative, to affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
DATED this

~day

of February, 1977.
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for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PET
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
MAILED a copy of the foregoing Brief to Dale R. Kent,
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant, Suite 100 Commercial Club,
Salt Lake City, Utah, this 12th day of February, 1977.

Yn~Mf
'f41~
secretary
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